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a b s t r a c t
Human evolution depends on the co-evolution between genetically determined behaviors and socially
transmitted information. Although vertical transmission of cultural information from parent to offspring
is common in hominins, its effects on cumulative cultural evolution are not fully understood. Here,
we investigate gene–culture co-evolution in a family-structured population by studying the invasion
fitness of a mutant allele that influences a deterministic level of cultural information (e.g., amount of
knowledge or skill) to which diploid carriers of the mutant are exposed in subsequent generations. We
show that the selection gradient on such a mutant, and the concomitant level of cultural information
it generates, can be evaluated analytically under the assumption that the cultural dynamic has a single
attractor point, thereby making gene–culture co-evolution in family-structured populations with multi-
generational effects mathematically tractable. We apply our result to study how genetically determined
phenotypes of individual and social learning co-evolve with the level of adaptive information they
generate under vertical transmission. We find that vertical transmission increases adaptive information
due to kin selection effects, but when information is transmitted as efficiently between family members
as between unrelated individuals, this increase is moderate in diploids. By contrast, we show that
the way resource allocation into learning trades off with allocation into reproduction (the ‘‘learning-
reproduction trade-off’’) significantly influences levels of adaptive information.We also show that vertical
transmission prevents evolutionary branching and may therefore play a qualitative role in gene–culture
co-evolutionary dynamics. More generally, our analysis of selection suggests that vertical transmission
can significantly increase levels of adaptive information under the biologically plausible condition that
information transmission between relatives is more efficient than between unrelated individuals.
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
0. Introduction
Cultural evolution, which is the change in non-genetically
transmitted phenotypes (or information) carried by individuals in
a population, is thought to have played a major role in human’s
ecological success (e.g., Laland et al., 2010; Boyd et al., 2011; van
Schaik, 2016). Cultural evolution rests on mechanisms by which
individuals learn and communicate, which themselves depend on
behavior or cognitive rules that are at least partially genetically
determined. Conversely, cultural evolution can significantly affect
reproduction and survival, which in turn affects selection on genes
determining behavior. Hominin evolution is therefore influenced
by gene–culture co-evolution, whereby genetically determined
behavior rules co-evolve along culturally transmitted informa-
tion (Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza, 1976; Lumsden and Wilson,
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1981; Aoki, 1986; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Feldman and Laland,
1996; van Schaik, 2016).
It is useful to distinguish between two broad cognitive mech-
anisms that underlie cultural evolution. First, cultural evolution
depends on individual learning (IL), which is a generic term for the
cognitive processes that lead to the creation of de novo non-innate
information by an individual, including trial-and-error learning,
statistical inference, or insight (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Rogers,
1988; Dugatkin, 2004; Aoki and Feldman, 2014; Wakano and
Miura, 2014). Second, cultural evolution is underlain by social
learning (SL), which refers to the cognitive processes that lead to
the acquisition of non-innate information from others (Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Rogers,
1988; Dugatkin, 2004; Aoki and Feldman, 2014; Wakano and
Miura, 2014). If genes are almost always transmitted vertically
from parent to offspring, cultural information can be acquired and
transmitted inmultipleways via SL. It can be transmitted vertically
from parent to offspring, but also horizontally from peer-to-peer,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2017.06.003
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or obliquely between unrelated individuals belonging to different
generations (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981).
While IL results in the generation of novel information, SL
enables the acquisition of skills or information that an individual
would be unable to acquire alone by IL over the course of its
lifetime. SL thus enables cumulative culture, which is a hallmark
of cultural evolution in human populations (e.g., Boyd et al., 2011;
van Schaik, 2016). A necessary but not sufficient condition for
cumulative culture to occur in a population is that individuals use
a composite learning strategy in which SL precedes IL (Boyd and
Richerson, 1985; Enquist et al., 2007; Aoki et al., 2012).
Since both IL and SL strategies determine cultural evolution,
much population work on gene–culture co-evolution has been de-
voted to understand the co-evolution between genetically deter-
mined IL and SL learning on one hand, and the amount of cultural
information they generate in evolutionary stable population states
on the other. This has led to a rich literature investigating the role of
various factors, such as the type of cultural information, the regime
of environmental change, or the structure of the population for
the evolution of IL and SL and their impact on cumulative culture
(e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Feldman et al., 1996; Wakano
et al., 2004;Wakano andAoki, 2006; Enquist et al., 2007; Rendell et
al., 2010; Nakahashi, 2010; Aoki et al., 2012; Lehmann et al., 2013;
Nakahashi, 2013; Aoki and Feldman, 2014; Wakano and Miura,
2014; Kobayashi et al., 2015; Ohtsuki et al., 2017).
The vast majority of such theoretical work has focused on
horizontal and oblique transmission, assuming that information
is transmitted independently from genotype via SL (i.e., between
randomly sampled individuals in the population, from the same
generation for horizontal transmission and different generations
for oblique transmission). In this case, the fate of amutant strategy,
here a genetically determined phenotype affecting IL and SL, that
arises as a single copy in a resident population can be studied
under the assumption that the mutant is in a cultural environ-
ment determined only by the resident (i.e., ‘‘evolutionary invasion
analysis’’). In other words, SL among mutants is so rare that it
can be neglected (no mutant–mutant interactions), which greatly
simplifies mathematical analysis (see Metz, 2011 for general con-
siderations on evolutionary invasion analysis and Aoki et al., 2012
for applications to cultural evolution).
When information is transmitted vertically via SL, however,
non-random interactions occur between individuals as transmis-
sion occurs in a way that is correlated to genotype. As a result,
transmission of cultural information amongmutants can no longer
be neglected and influences the fate of a mutant strategy. In other
words, kin selection occurs (i.e., natural selectionwhen individuals
interact with others that are more likely to share a recent common
ancestor than individuals sampled randomly from the population,
Hamilton, 1964; Michod, 1982; Frank, 1998; Rousset, 2004; van
Baalen, 2013; Lehmann et al., 2016). Intuitively, kin selection will
favor learning strategies that promote the transmission of adaptive
information since related individuals in downstream generations
preferentially benefit from this information. This should influence
cultural transmission from parent to offspring and hence the selec-
tion pressure on IL and SL, whichwill depend onmultigenerational
effects of genetically determined phenotypes.
Despite the potential importance of vertical transmission and
its prominent role in cultural evolution theory (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman, 1981; Feldman and Zhivotovsky, 1992; McElreath
and Strimling, 2008), few studies have investigated the evolution of
IL and SL and its effect on cumulative culture under vertical trans-
mission. Models with vertical cultural transmission either do not
allow for the transformation of cultural information by genetically
determined phenotypes (and therefore do not allow to consider
cumulative cultural evolution with multigenerational effects, e.g.,
Feldman and Zhivotovsky, 1992); or make specific assumptions
on learning dynamics and the trade-off between resource alloca-
tion into learning and into reproduction (Kobayashi et al., 2015;
Ohtsuki et al., 2017), from which it is difficult to get a broad
view of the impact of vertical transmission on cultural evolution.
The learning-reproduction trade-off, which reflects biologically
realistic constraints between life-history components, can signifi-
cantly compromise the accumulation of culture (Nakahashi, 2010;
Lehmann et al., 2013; Wakano and Miura, 2014; Kobayashi et al.,
2015; Ohtsuki et al., 2017). However, its general importance is not
fully understood because most previous studies assume that the
marginal cost of learning (i.e., the effect of learning on reproductive
success holding everything else is constant), which influences the
learning-reproduction trade-off, is constant (Lehmann et al., 2013;
Wakano and Miura, 2014; Kobayashi et al., 2015; Ohtsuki et al.,
2017, but see Nakahashi, 2010 for an exception).
The above considerations highlight that currently, there exists
no framework to systematically carry out an evolutionary invasion
analysis for gene–culture co-evolution under vertical transmis-
sionwithmultigenerational effects (i.e., gene–culture co-evolution
family structured populations). Since a primary form of transmis-
sion of information in humans is vertical (Cavalli-Sforza and Feld-
man, 1981; Guglielmino et al., 1995; Hewlett et al., 2011; Konner,
2010), such a framework would be useful to understand cultural
evolution. In particular, it would allow determining how the level
of culture generated by evolving IL and SL departs under vertical
transmission from oblique and horizontal transmission, and assess
the importance of the learning-reproduction trade-off.
The aimof this paper is therefore two-fold: (1) develop amathe-
matical model to perform evolutionary invasion analysis for gene–
culture co-evolution in a diploid family-structured population; and
(2) study the effects of vertical transmission on the evolution of
IL and SL and the concomitant level of adaptive information they
generate. In the first part of this paper, we derive the invasion
fitness of alleles in a diploid, family-structured population, when
each individual carry cultural information, which can be a stock of
knowledge, skill, or any other form of biotic or abiotic capital. The
cultural information of an offspring depends deterministically on
the cultural information in the parental generation, and therefore
on transmission modes, but also on the alleles in the offspring
and in the parental generation. In turn, cultural information in the
population affect the reproductive success of individuals, resulting
in eco-evolutionary feedbacks between genes and cultural infor-
mation. Second, we apply our framework to the evolution of IL and
SL strategies and the concomitant level of adaptive information
they generate.
1. Gene–culture co-evolution in a family-structured popula-
tion
1.1. Life-cycle
We consider a diploid monoecious population of large and
constant size (large enough to neglect random genetic drift) that
is structured into families, each founded by a mated individual.
The discrete time life-cycle of this population is as follows. (1)
Each individual produces offspring and then either survives or dies
(independently of age so that there is no explicit age-structure).
(2) Randommating among juveniles occurs and then each juvenile
either survives or dies (possibly according to density-dependent
competition) to make it to the next generation of adults.
Each individual carries a cultural information variable E , which
is possibly multidimensional and which can represent the total
amount of knowledge or skill held by that individual at the stage
of reproduction. The cultural information variable E is indirectly
influenced by the genetic composition of the population and affects
the survival of adults or juveniles, and/or individual fecundity.
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1.2. Evolutionary invasion analysis
We assume that only two alleles can segregate in the popula-
tion, a mutant with type τ and a resident with type θ , which are
taken from the setΘ of all possible types. In order to determine the
fate (establishment or extinction) of themutant τ when it arises as
a single copy in the population (e.g., Fisher, 1930; Hamilton, 1967;
Maynard Smith, 1982; Eshel and Feldman, 1984; Charlesworth,
1994; Metz et al., 1996; Ferrière and Gatto, 1995; Metz, 2011; van
Baalen, 2013), we seek an expression for invasion fitnessW (τ , θ ),
which is here taken to be the geometric growth rate of themutant τ
introduced into the θ population (Cohen, 1979; Tuljapurkar, 1989;
Caswell, 2000; Tuljapurkar et al., 2003). Invasion fitnessW (τ , θ ) is
the per capita number of mutant copies produced asymptotically
over a time step of the reproductive process by the whole mutant
lineage descending from the initial mutant (as long as the mutant
remains rare), and if W (τ , θ ) is less or equal to one, then the
mutant lineage goes extinct with certainty (Lehmann et al., 2016).
Therefore an uninvadable strategy θ ; namely, a strategy resisting
invasion by any type satisfies
θ ∈ argmax
τ∈Θ W (τ , θ ), (1)
i.e., θ maximizes invasion fitness for a resident population at the
uninvadable state.
In order to understand gene–culture co-evolution, we aim to
derive an expression for invasion fitnessW (τ , θ ) that incorporates
how gene (embodied by the segregating alleles, which for example
code for genetically determined learning strategies) and culture
(embodied by cultural information E) both affect the reproductive
success of individuals, and how E depends on alleles in the popula-
tion. In this task,we first note that under the assumption of random
mating, we can neglect homozygote mutants since they are rare
during invasion and so only need to consider mutant individuals
that are heterozygotes. Then, we denote by w(τ , θ, Et (τ , θ )) the
expected number of successful offspring produced by a heterozy-
gote mutant adult over one life cycle iteration at demographic
time t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., since the appearance of the mutant at
t = 0. Thus, this fitness is an expression for individual fitness as
defined in population genetics and social evolution (e.g., Nagy-
laki, 1992; Frank, 1998; Rousset, 2004; Lehmann et al., 2016).
Individual fitness w(τ , θ, Et (τ , θ )) depends on both the mutant τ
and resident θ types since (i) heterozygotes carry both alleles and
(ii) fitness depends on the behavior of individuals in the population
at large, composed of homozygotes for the resident. Individual fit-
nessw(τ , θ, Et (τ , θ )) also depends on the cultural variable Et (τ , θ )
of an individual carrying the mutant at demographic time t , which
itself depends on τ and θ .
Since individuals carrying the mutant allele are all heterozy-
gotes during invasion, there are no fluctuations of allele frequen-
cieswithinmutant individuals (no stochastic fluctuations between
heterozygote andhomozygote states owing to segregation). Hence,
a heterozygote parent can at most have a heterozygote offspring
for the mutant allele, and assuming that there are no exogenous
stochastic effects on E , we can let the sequence of environments
{Et (τ , θ )}∞t=0 of a lineage of heterozygote mutants follow a discrete
deterministic dynamic:
Et (τ , θ ) = F (τ , θ, Et−1(τ , θ ), E(θ, θ )). (2)
Here, F is the cultural map: it transforms the cultural information
Et−1(τ , θ ) of a mutant lineage member at generation t − 1 into a
new cultural information experienced by a lineage member at the
next generation t . As shown by Eq. (2), the cultural information
of a mutant depends on its genetically determined behavior (first
argument in F , τ ) and that of a resident (second argument in F ,
θ ), as well as on the cultural information Et−1(τ , θ ) of a mutant in
the parental generation since vertical transmission can occur (third
argument in F , Et−1(τ , θ )) and on the cultural information in the
resident population (fourth argument in F , E(θ, θ )) that satisfies
E(θ, θ ) = F (θ, θ, E(θ, θ ), E(θ, θ )), (3)
the steady-state version of Eq. (2) with τ = θ . A concrete example
for the cultural map F within the context of social and individual
learning can be found in Section 2 (Eq. (24)).
We assume that the sequence of cultural information
{Et (τ , θ )}∞t=0 converges to a unique fixed point E(τ , θ ) =
limt→∞Et (τ , θ ), satisfying
E(τ , θ ) = F(τ , θ, E(τ , θ ), E(θ, θ )) . (4)
This is the key simplifying assumption in our analysis, from which
it follows (see Appendix A) that invasion fitness is equal to
W (τ , θ ) = w(τ, θ, E(τ , θ )) , (5)
i.e., the individual fitness of a mutant evaluated at the cultural
equilibrium of the mutant lineage cultural dynamics (Eq. (4)).
Invasion fitness W (τ , θ ) as given by Eq. (5) shows that it de-
pends on the equilibrium cultural state E(τ , θ ), which is itself a
function of the mutant strategy. Hence, even though the mutant
is globally rare, individuals carrying the mutant allele affect the
cultural information to which other mutant carriers are exposed
in subsequent generations. This results in carry-over effects across
generations that influence selection on the mutant.
1.3. Selection gradient and local uninvadability
In order to better understand how carry-over effects across
generations influence selection, we assume that the genes carried
by an individual determine a vector of n quantitative traits (Θ =
Rn) and that genes have additive effects on phenotype. We let
the vector θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) ∈ Rn represent the genetically
determined phenotype of a resident individual (homozygote for
the resident allele). Similarly, τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn) ∈ Rn is the
phenotype of a heterozygote individual, and z = (z1, z2, . . . , zn) ∈
Rn the phenotype of a homozygotemutant. Owing to additive gene
action, the phenotypic trait i of a heterozygote is the mid-value
τi = zi + θi2 . (6)
We can therefore write the phenotypic vector τ of a heterozygote
as τ (z, θ ), which emphasizes that it depends on the two homozy-
gote phenotypes. With this notation, invasion fitness (Eq. (5)) can
be written as
w
(
τ (z, θ ), θ, E(τ (z, θ ), θ)
)
. (7)
It follows from Eq. (7) and the linear dependence of τ on z and θ
(Eq. (6)) that
θ ∈ argmax
z∈Rn
w
(
τ (z, θ ), θ, E(τ (z, θ ), θ)
)
⇐⇒ θ ∈ argmax
τ∈Θ w(τ, θ, E(τ , θ )) , (8)
i.e., θ is an uninvadable strategy if we cannot find a genetically
determined phenotype z expressed by a homozygote individual
that wouldmake a heterozygote individual with phenotype τ (z, θ )
better off than the resident homozygote θ .
The first-order necessary condition for uninvadability must
therefore satisfy
∂w
(
τ (z, θ ), θ, E(τ (z, θ ), θ)
)
∂zi
⏐⏐⏐⏐
z=θ
= 1
2
∂w(τ , θ, E(τ , θ ))
∂τi
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
= 0 for all i, (9)
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using the chain rule and Eq. (6). Hence, we can write the first order
necessary condition for uninvadability as
si(θ ) = 0 for all i, (10)
where
si(θ ) = ∂w(τ , θ, E(τ , θ ))
∂τi
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
(11)
is the selection gradient on trait i, which captures the effect of
directional selection on trait i and allows to compute candidate
uninvadable strategies, the so-called singular strategies that sat-
isfy Eq. (10) (e.g., Geritz et al., 1998; Rousset, 2004; Leimar,
2009). Eq. (11) shows that under additive gene action (Eq. (6)),
the selection gradient can be expressed in terms of variation in
heterozygote effects (the τi’s), which has the attractive feature of
allowing us to keep simple notations throughout and apply the
model to both haploids and diploids with the same notation.
We now disentangle the role of the effects of an individual
on its own cultural information (direct effects) from those it has
on downstream generations (indirect effects) for selection. To do
so, we first use the chain rule to express the selection gradient
(Eq. (11)) as
si(θ ) = ∂w(τ , θ, E(θ, θ ))
∂τi
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
+ ∂w(θ, θ, E)
∂E
⏐⏐⏐⏐
E=E(θ,θ )
× ∂E(τ , θ )
∂τi
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
. (12)
The last term of Eq. (12) can be found by first differentiating Eq. (4)
on both sides with respect to τi using the chain rule,
∂E(τ , θ )
∂τi
= ∂F(τ , θ, E(θ, θ ), E(θ, θ ))
∂τi
+ ∂E(τ , θ )
∂τi
∂F(θ, θ, E, E(θ, θ ))
∂E , (13)
where the derivative in ∂F(θ, θ, E, E(θ, θ )) /∂E is with respect
to the third argument of F (Eq. (4)). We then solve Eq. (13) for
∂E(τ , θ )/∂τi, which yields
∂E(τ , θ )
∂τi
= ∂F(τ , θ, E(θ, θ ), E(θ, θ ))
∂τi
× 1
1− ∂F(θ,θ,E,E(θ,θ ))
∂E
. (14)
Substituting Eq. (14) into Eq. (12) gives
si(θ ) = ∂w(τ , θ, E(θ, θ ))
∂τi
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
+ ∂w(θ, θ, E)
∂E
⏐⏐⏐⏐
E=E(θ,θ )
× ∂F (τ , θ, E(θ, θ ), E(θ, θ ))
∂τi
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
×Λ(θ ), (15)
where
Λ(θ ) = 1
1− ∂F (θ,θ,E,E(θ,θ ))
∂E
⏐⏐⏐⏐
E=E(θ,θ )
> 0 (16)
is positive owing to our assumption that the cultural dy-
namic Eq. (2) has a single fixed point (so that −1 <
∂F (θ, θ, E, E(θ, θ ))/∂E < 1).
Eq. (15) shows that the selection gradient is the sum of two
terms. The first terms is the change in the fitness of an individual
changing its trait i by an infinitesimal amount (i.e., by switch-
ing from the resident to mutant trait expression), which is the
standard selection gradient in panmictic populationswithout class
structure or effects on cultural information (e.g., Geritz et al.,
1998; Rousset, 2004). The second term in Eq. (15) captures the
fitness effects of cultural changes, cumulated over the lineage of a
focal mutant. These cumulative effects are equal to the product of
(i) the sensitivity of fitness to cultural change (∂w(θ, θ, E)/∂E),
(ii) the sensitivity of current cultural dynamics to a change in trait
value in an individual (∂F (τ , θ, E(θ, θ ), E(θ, θ ))/∂τi), and (iii) the
multi-generational effects Λ(θ ) on the culture experienced by a
focal mutant of a change in cultural dynamics over all individuals
in a line of descent connected to the focal mutant.
The multi-generational effects Λ(θ ) can be decomposed be-
tween the ‘‘direct effect’’ of a focal mutant on its own culture, and
the ‘‘indirect carry-over effects’’ of a lineage of mutants on the
culture experienced by its members as follows
Λ(θ ) = 1
‘‘direct effect’’
+
∞∑
t=1
(
∂F (θ, θ, E, E(θ, θ ))
∂E
⏐⏐⏐⏐
E=E(θ,θ )
)t
  
‘‘indirect carry-over effects’’
, (17)
where (∂F/∂E)t can be interpreted as the effect of the focal mu-
tant on the culture of an individual living t ≥ 1 generations
downstream. Hence, in the absence of carry-over effects across
generations, the selection pressure is given by Eq. (15)withΛ(θ ) =
1. Otherwise, the selection pressure on a trait will depend on
its carry-over effects across generations within the family. The
selection gradient (Eq. (15)) can be understood as an inclusive
fitness effect of expressing the mutant allele (Hamilton, 1964;
Frank, 1998; Rousset, 2004), in which the second summand in
Eq. (17) is conceptually analogous to the carry-over effects that
arise in spatially structured populations when individuals affect
local environmental dynamics in a deterministic way (Lehmann,
2008 e.g., eq. 17).
When the difference between non-singular resident and mu-
tant phenotypes is small (∥τ − θ∥ ≪ 1), the selection gradient
is sufficient to determine whether the mutant will go extinct or
fix in the population (see Rousset, 2004 for a general argument
about this). A singular phenotype θ∗ (such that si(θ∗) = 0 for
all i) will then be approached by gradual evolution irrespective of
the effects of local mutations on traits, i.e., is strongly convergence
stable (Leimar, 2009), if the n × n Jacobian J(θ∗) matrix with (i, j)
entry(
J(θ∗)
)
ij =
∂si(θ )
∂θj
⏐⏐⏐⏐
θ=θ∗
(18)
is negative-definite at θ∗ (or equivalently, if (J(θ∗) + J(θ∗)T)/2 has
only negative eigenvalues), which implies that J(θ∗) has eigen-
values that all have negative real parts. At a convergence stable
singular resident (si(θ∗) = 0 for all i), then×nHessianH(θ∗)matrix
with (i, j) entry(
H(θ∗)
)
ij =
∂2w(τ, θ∗, E(τ , θ∗))
∂τi∂τj
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ∗
(19)
determines whether the resident is locally uninvadable, which is
the case if H(θ∗) is negative-definite at θ∗. If that is not the case,
then disruptive selection and evolutionary branching can occur.
Eqs. (18)–(19) give the standard multidimensional (strong) con-
vergence stability and local uninvadability conditions for a finite
number of quantitative traits (e.g., Lessard, 1990; Leimar, 2009;
Mullon et al., 2016). Further, the eigenvectors of theHessianmatrix
can be used to determine which type of correlation between traits
will be favored by selection when it is disruptive (Mullon et al.,
2016 eq. 9).
2. Gene–culture co-evolution and IL and SL levels
2.1. Reproductive assumptions
We now apply our framework to study gene–culture co-
evolution through IL and SL. We let E ∈ R+ stand for the amount
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of adaptive non-innate information that an individual acquires
during its lifespan by IL and SL. We are interested in the evolution
of resource allocation to IL and SL, and assume that a homozygote
individual expressing the resident allele allocates a fraction θL ∈
[0, 1] of its resources to learning (baseline unit of one), and a
fraction θIL ∈ [0, 1] of that effort to IL. Hence, an individual
allocates θLθIL unit of resources to IL, θL(1 − θIL) units to SL, and
1 − θL to any other function of the organism (e.g., offspring pro-
duction,maintenance, etc.), creating a trade-off between allocating
resources to learning and other functions of the organism (e.g.,
Nakahashi, 2010; Lehmann et al., 2013; Wakano and Miura, 2014;
Kobayashi et al., 2015).With this, a resident homozygote expresses
the vector θ = (θIL, θL) ∈ [0, 1]2 of phenotypes and a heterozygote
mutant has trait vector τ = (τIL, τL) ∈ [0, 1]2.
We aim to assess the role of vertical transmission on the unin-
vadable learning strategy and concomitant level of adaptive infor-
mation. In order to do this for a mathematically tractable model,
we assume that after IL and SL have been performed, an individual
gathers energy according to the amount of adaptive information
it has learnt and the resources it has left, reproduces using its
gathered energy, and then dies (semelparous reproduction). Under
these assumptions, the fitness of a heterozygote mutant can be
written as
w(τ, θ, E(τ , θ )) = f (τL, E(τ , θ ))
f (θL, E(θ, θ ))
, (20)
where f (τL, E(τ , θ )) is the fecundity (number of offspring pro-
duced) of a mutant, and f (θL, E(θ, θ )) is the average fecundity in
the population, which is given by the fecundity of a resident in
a monomorphic resident population. Eq. (20) immediately shows
that in a resident monomorphic population, invasion fitness is
equal to one: w(θ, θ, E(θ, θ )) = 1.
2.2. Learning-reproduction trade-off and learning costs
Since allocating more resources τL into learning deviates re-
sources from reproduction, we assume that fecundity is monoton-
ically decreasing with τL (i.e., −∂ f (τL, E(θ, θ ))/∂τL > 0, which is
the ‘‘marginal cost of learning’’). The trade-off between allocating
resources to learning, which is captured by the total derivative of
fecundity with respect to learning τL,
df (τL, E(τ , θ ))
dτL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
= ∂E(τ , θ )
∂τL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
× ∂ f (θ, E)
∂E
⏐⏐⏐⏐
E=E(θ,θ )
− −∂ f (τL, E(θ, θ ))
∂τL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
, (21)
is directly influenced by the marginal cost of learning. Previous
theoretical works have assumed that the marginal cost of learning
is constant (and usually equals E(θ, θ ), see eq. 1 of Lehmann et al.,
2013; eq. 11 of Wakano and Miura, 2014; eq. 4 of Kobayashi
et al., 2015, eq. 4 of Ohtsuki et al., 2017, see Nakahashi, 2010 for
an exception). Here, we do not make any such assumption, which
allows us to evaluate the effects of different types of learning-
reproduction trade-offs. Note that because cultural information E
is adaptive, we assume that fecundity is monotonically increasing
with E (i.e., ∂ f (θ, E)/∂E > 0, which is the ‘‘marginal benefit of
information’’). This means that the total derivative of fecundity
with respect to learning τL (Eq. (21)) is proportional to
df (τL, E(τ , θ ))
dτL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
∝ ∂E(τ , θ )
∂τL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
− Ce(θ ), (22)
where
Ce(θ ) = −∂ f (τL, E(θ, θ ))
∂τL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
/
∂ f (θ, E)
∂E
⏐⏐⏐⏐
E=E(θ,θ )
, (23)
is the ratio of the marginal cost of learning to the marginal benefit
of adaptive information. The quantity Ce(θ ) can be thought of as
a marginal rate of substitution (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001),
i.e., how much an individual is ready to invest in learning in
exchange for obtaining adaptive information while maintaining
the same level of fecundity, which will turn out to be an important
measure of learning cost. We refer to Ce(θ ) as the effective cost of
learning.
2.3. Cultural information assumptions
2.3.1. Cultural dynamics and resident cultural equilibrium
We now introduce the dynamics of adaptive information
Et (τ , θ ) held by a heterozygotemutant in demographic time period
t at the time of reproduction (after SL and IL occurred). Individuals
acquire adaptive information by performing SL from the parental
generation by way of vertical transmission with probability v and
oblique transmission with probability 1 − v, but we assume that
the efficiency of SL is independent of whether transmission occurs
vertically or obliquely (see Kobayashi et al., 2015, for similar
assumptions under haploid reproduction). The main dynamic as-
sumption we make about adaptive information is that it satisfies
the recursion
Et+1(τ , θ ) = F (τ , θ, Et (τ , θ ), E(θ, θ ))
= aIL(τ )+ pSL(τ )
(
v
(Et (τ , θ )+ E(θ, θ )
2
)
+ (1− v)E(θ, θ )
)
, (24)
which depends on two terms. First, it depends on the information
aIL(τ ) an individual can obtain by performing IL alone. This is
assumed to be equal to zero in the absence of effort τLτIL devoted to
IL, to increase and eventually saturatewith effort τLτIL. Hence, aIL(·)
is a function of a single argument: aIL(τ ) = aIL(τLτIL), butwewrite it
in terms of τ for ease of presentation. Second, adaptive information
depends on the fraction pSL(τ ) of information an individual obtains
by SL from the parental generation. This is assumed to increase
monotonically with the effort τL(1 − τIL) allocated to SL. So, pSL(·)
is also a function of a single argument: pSL(τ ) = pSL(τL(1− τIL)).
The information obtained from the parental generation de-
pends on the type of exemplar individual from which information
is obtained. The interpretation of Eq. (24) is that with probability v
the cultural parent of the mutant is one of its two genetic parent,
in which case with probability 1/2 the exemplar is a heterozygote
mutant who carries information level Et (τ , θ ) and with probability
1/2, a homozygote for the resident who carries resident informa-
tion level E(θ, θ ). With probability 1 − v the mutant performs
oblique transmission, in which case the exemplar is a resident
with the information level E(θ, θ ). The equilibrium resident level
of information satisfies
E(θ, θ ) = aIL(θ )+ pSL(θ )E(θ, θ ) (25)
(by setting τ = θ in Eq. (24) and letting E(θ, θ ) = limt→∞Et (θ, θ )),
or equivalently,
E(θ, θ ) = aIL(θ )
1− pSL(θ ) . (26)
Our formulation of cultural dynamics in terms of IL and SL
components (aIL(τ ) and pSL(τ )) allows us to capture a variety
of learning models that have previously been considered in the
gene–culture co-evolution literature. For instance, Eq. (24) allows
to capture the classical models of IL and SL learning, where E
represents the probability of expressing the ‘‘correct’’ (or ‘‘opti-
mal’’) learned phenotype (e.g., light a fire), when an individual can
express two alternative behaviors: the ‘‘correct’’ or the ‘‘wrong’’
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phenotype (e.g., Rogers, 1988; Enquist et al., 2007; Kobayashi
and Wakano, 2012; Aoki and Feldman, 2014; Wakano and Miura,
2014 and see Section 2.3.2 for a concrete example). Equation (24)
also allows to capture situations where the amount of information
represents the total stock of knowledge or skill of an individual
(e.g., Nakahashi, 2010; Aoki et al., 2012; Kobayashi and Aoki, 2012;
Lehmann et al., 2013; Wakano and Miura, 2014; Kobayashi et al.,
2015; Ohtsuki et al., 2017). Regardless of the precise cultural trait
followed, Eq. (24) embodies the feature that an individual can add
up information by SL to that acquired by IL, which can result in
a larger amount of cultural information at steady state, i.e., SL
increases the amount of adaptive information by a factor 1/(1 −
pSL((1−θIL)θL)) (Eq. (26)). Hence, cumulative cultural evolution can
occur.
2.3.2. Mutant cultural equilibrium
From Eq. (24), themutant equilibrium level of cultural informa-
tion is
E(τ , θ ) = lim
t→∞ Et (τ , θ ) =
(
1
1− vpSL(τ )/2
)
aIL(τ )
+
(
1− v/2
1− vpSL(τ )/2
)
pSL(τ )E(θ, θ ). (27)
Comparing Eq. (27) to Eq. (25) shows that for amutant who invests
more in learning than residents (aIL(τ ) > aIL(θ ), pSL(τ ) > pSL(θ )),
vertical transmission (v > 0) increases both the level of individ-
ually and socially learned information relative to the baselines of
aIL(θ ) and pSL(θ )E(θ, θ ) obtained by a resident individual (Eq. (25)).
Hence, vertical transmission increases the effective amount of IL
and SL under selection.
2.4. Co-evolutionary equilibrium
We substitute the mutant information equilibrium (Eq. (27))
into the fitness function (Eq. (20)) to compute the selection gra-
dients on the two evolving traits,
sL(θ ) = ∂w(τ , θ, E(τ , θ ))
∂τL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
and
sIL(θ ) = ∂w(τ , θ, E(τ , θ ))
∂τIL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
,
(28)
which describe the adaptive dynamics of the phenotypic traits
that determine IL and SL. A necessary first-order condition for the
learning rules to be locally uninvadable is then that sL(θ∗) = 0 and
sIL(θ∗) = 0, where the associated cultural information E(θ∗, θ∗)
satisfies Eq. (26). Whether the so-obtained singular strategies θ∗
are convergence stable and locally uninvadable can be determined
using the Jacobian and Hessian matrices Eqs. (18)–(19) (see Ap-
pendix B).
We find that the selection gradient on learning can be expressed
as
sL(θ )
= k(θ )
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝Λ(θ )
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝θIL daIL(x)dx
⏐⏐⏐⏐
x=θILθL
+ (1− θIL)E(θ, θ ) dpSL(y)dy
⏐⏐⏐⏐
y=(1−θIL )θL  
∂F (τ ,θ,E(θ,θ ),E(θ,θ ))/∂τL
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠− Ce(θ )
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
(29)
where
k(θ ) = 1
f (θL, E(θ, θ ))
df (θL, E)
dE
⏐⏐⏐⏐
E=E(θ,θ )
> 0, (30)
is a proportionality factor that does not affect the direction of
selection,
Λ(θ ) = 1
1− vpSL(θ )/2 (31)
captures the multi-generational effects that relatives, including
the focal, have on the information E held by a focal individual
(Eq. (17)), and Ce(θ ) is the effective cost of learning (Eq. (23)).
Eq. (29) shows that the selection pressure on learning θL de-
pends on (1) the marginal gain in information of a mutant
(∂F (τ , θ, E(θ, θ ), E(θ, θ ))/∂τL, which is the average information
gain from IL weighted by θIL and SL weighted by 1 − θIL), due to
the cumulated effectsΛ(θ ) of its own learning (‘‘direct effect’’) and
that of its ancestors (‘‘indirect effect’’, see Eq. (17)); (2) the effective
cost Ce(θ ) of learning (Eq. (23)).
Meanwhile, we find that the selection gradient on IL (θIL),
sIL(θ ) = θLk(θ )Λ(θ )
×
(
daIL(x)
dx
⏐⏐⏐⏐
x=θILθL
− E(θ, θ )dpSL(y)
dy
⏐⏐⏐⏐
y=(1−θIL)θL
)
(32)
balances the marginal benefit of IL (daIL(x)/dx) and the marginal
cost (−dpSL(y)/dy) of allocating less resources to SL. Interestingly,
vertical transmission does not directly influence the direction of
selection on IL. Its influence may however be indirect through it
effects on θL and therefore on the marginal benefits and cost of IL.
The selection gradient on learning (Eqs. (29)–(31)) shows that
vertical transmission, by increasing the multi-generational effects
Λ(θ ) (Eq. (31)), amplifies the benefits of learning (Eq. (29)). This
can be understood by considering that under vertical transmission,
gathering adaptive informationwill later preferentially benefit rel-
atives. But since pSL(y) < 1, vertical transmission can amplify the
benefits of learning by atmost a factor of 2 in thismodel (when v =
1, Eq. (31)). This moderate impact of vertical transmission is due
to the assumptions underlying information dynamics (Eq. (24)):
individuals are diploids, vertical transmission is equally likely to
occur between a mutant offspring and its mutant and resident
parents, and vertical transmission has no effect on the efficiency
of transmission. As a result of these assumptions, information
transformation Eq. (24) depends linearly on vertical transmission
rate v and only by a factor of 1/2, which limits the effect of vertical
transmission.
More generally, the effect of vertical transmission on the ampli-
fication factor of learning benefits is given by
dΛ(θ )
dv
= d
dv
∂F (θ, θ, E, E(θ, θ ))
∂E
⏐⏐⏐⏐
E=E(θ,θ )
/
(
1− ∂F (θ, θ, E, E(θ, θ ))
∂E
⏐⏐⏐⏐
E=E(θ,θ )
)2
, (33)
which depends on the effect of v on how the mutant environment
affect its own dynamic. Eq. (33) reveals that if vertical information
has a large effect on cultural dynamics, then it can have a large im-
pact onΛ(θ ), and thus have a significant influence on the evolution
of learning strategies (Eq. (11)) and cumulative culture. This will
occur for instance if for the same effort allocated to SL, the fraction
of information pSL obtained socially from an exemplar depends
linearly on v (e.g., if offspring learn at a faster rate from their ge-
netic parent than from unrelated individuals), or if E depends non-
linearly on v (e.g., if offspring first learn from their genetic parent
and then learn obliquely at a different rate). The assumptions of
our model (Eq. (24)) are therefore conservative for the effect of
vertical transmission on cumulative culture. We endorsed them
because they allow to make direct comparison with models in
the literature, to obtain manageable analytical expression, and to
check the validity of our results with individual-based simulations,
three endeavors to which we next turn.
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2.5. Evolution of learning to obtain the ‘‘correct’’ phenotype
In order to fully work out a concrete application of our ap-
proach, wemake some further assumptions about the dynamics of
cultural information, and let E be the probability that at the stage
of reproduction an individual expresses the ‘‘correct’’ phenotype
in its environment (e.g., Rogers, 1988; Enquist et al., 2007; Aoki
and Feldman, 2014; Wakano and Miura, 2014). We assume that
learning occurs on a fast time scale that is embedded in a single
demographic time period (see Appendix C for details). In this
mechanistic model, individuals first perform SL from the parental
generation for (1 − τIL)τL units of time (on the fast time scale) at
rate β , proportionally to the distance between the probabilities E
of the exemplar and target individuals. Individuals then perform
IL for τILτL units of time at a rate α proportionally to the distance
between its current probability E and the upper bound 1 (since it is
a probability). In this case, we show in Appendix C that the cultural
level obtained by an individual can be written in the form
aIL(τ ) = 1− exp(−ατILτL) and
pSL(τ ) = exp(−ατILτL) [1− exp(−β(1− τIL)τL)] . (34)
Interestingly, Eq. (34) also captures the ‘‘critical social learning
strategy’’, where an individual first learns from the parental gener-
ation by SL and then, if it has not acquired the correct phenotype,
performs IL (Enquist et al., 2007; Rendell et al., 2010, see also
Eq. (C.6) in Appendix C for the interpretation of Eq. (34) in terms of
the critical social learner strategy).
We assume that fecundity depends on whether the correct
phenotype is acquired, and write it as
f (τL, E(τ , θ )) = 1+ E(τ , θ )(1− τL)1−γ1
+ λ [1− E(τ , θ )] (1− τL)γ2 , (35)
where ‘‘1’’ is the baseline reproductive unit and the rest can be
understood as follows. A mutant has (1 − τL) units of resources
left to allocate into reproduction and the effect of this allocation
on fecundity depends on whether a mutant expresses the correct
phenotype. When the mutant has the ‘‘correct’’ phenotype (with
probability E(τ , θ )), returns on investment are controlled by γ1 and
we assume that 0 ≤ γ1 < 1 so that returns rise linearly (γ1 = 0)
or sharply with investment (γ1 > 0, Fig. 1). When the mutant has
the ‘‘wrong’’ phenotype (with probability 1− E(τ , θ )), returns are
tuned by γ2 and we assume that γ2 > 1 so that returns increase
slowly with initial investment. Finally, the parameter 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
bounds the fecundity of an individual with the wrong phenotype
(Fig. 1). For example, an individual with the wrong phenotypewho
invests all resources into reproduction (τL = 0) has a fecundity
1 + λ. The parameters γ1, γ2 and λ in Eq. (35) therefore influence
how resources allocated into learning trade-off with fecundity.
2.5.1. Effect of vertical transmission on cumulative culture
We first work out the case where expressing the wrong phe-
notype results in zero effects on fitness (λ = 0, the usual case
in the literature, Rogers, 1988; Enquist et al., 2007; Kobayashi
and Wakano, 2012; Wakano and Miura, 2014; Aoki and Feldman,
2014), forwhich singular learning strategies (θ∗L , θ
∗
IL) and the corre-
sponding levels of information E∗ they generate can be determined
analytically. Substituting Eqs. (34)–(35) into Eq. (32), we find that
solving for θ∗IL such that sIL(θ
∗
L , θ
∗
IL) = 0, there is a unique IL singular
strategy
θ∗IL =
1
θ∗L α
log
(
β
β − α
)
, (36)
which rapidly (hyperbolically) decreases with the resources θ∗L
allocated to learning, but is otherwise independent of the rate of
vertical transmission (as predicted by Eq. (32)). Eq. (36) also shows
Fig. 1. Components of the fecundity function (Eq. (35)) as a result of expressing the
correct or wrong phenotype. When a mutant expresses the correct phenotype, it
obtains rapidly rising returns on investment ((1− τL)1−γ1 where 0 ≤ γ1 < 1 tunes
the sharpness of the rise, in green).When amutant expresses thewrong phenotype,
it obtains slowly rising returns on investment (λ(1 − τL)γ2 where γ2 > 1 controls
how slowly the returns are and 0 ≤ λ < 1 bounds the returns, in pink). The total
effect on fecundity Eq. (35) is then given by the average returns, averaged over the
probabilities of expressing the correct (E(τ , θ )) and wrong (1−E(τ , θ )) phenotype.
that for individuals to evolve a composite learning strategy (0 <
θ∗IL < 1) that mixes SL and IL, it is necessary (but not sufficient)
that the rate of SL is greater than the rate of IL (β > α), otherwise
SL cannot be a singular strategy (and θ∗IL = 1).
Substituting Eqs. (34)–(35) into Eq. (29) with λ = 0, we find
that learning increases from zero (when θL = 0 and θIL = 1) when
α > 0 (i.e., sL(0, 1) > 0 when α > 0). Then, solving sL(θ∗L , θ
∗
IL) for
θ∗L such that sL(θ
∗
L , θ
∗
IL) = 0 using Eq. (36), we find that there is a
unique singular level of learning that is given by
θ∗L = 1−
1
β
(
W (x)+ v(1− γ1)
2
)
, (37)
where W (x) is the principal solution of the Lambert function (the
solution for y in x = yey) with argument
x = (1− γ1)[αv + β(2− v)]
2β
(
β
β − α
)1− βα
× exp
(
β − v(1− γ1)
2
)
. (38)
Then, by substituting the singular strategies Eqs. (36)–(37) into
Eq. (26), we find that the singular interior learning strategy gen-
erates a level
E∗ = 2αW (x)
2αW (x)+ (1− γ1)(2β + v(α − β)) (39)
of adaptive information. If, like Enquist et al. (2007), we assume
that learning has nomarginal cost (i.e., γ1 = 1), that all individuals
engage into learning (θL = 1), and that there is no vertical trans-
mission (v = 0), we recover Enquist et al. (2007)’s result: efficient
social transmission of information (β ≫ 0) promotes high levels of
adaptive information (see Appendix D, Eq. (D.1)–(D.3) for details).
More generally, however, a numerical inspection of the sin-
gular learning strategies (θ∗L , θ
∗
IL), and the corresponding amount
of adaptive information E∗ they generate, highlight the difficulty
for adaptive information to accumulate (Fig. 2). In particular, even
though vertical transmission v increases the amount of time in-
vested into learning and adaptive information, its effect is moder-
ate (Fig. 2, top row). In fact, from Eq. (39), we see that under pure
oblique transmission (v = 0), the level of information converges
asymptotically to
E∗ = α
α + (1− γ1) , (40)
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Fig. 2. Singular learning strategy θ∗L and the corresponding level of adaptive information E∗ it generates (obtained from Eqs. (36)–(39)) as a function of the vertical
transmission rate v (Top row), the rate of social learning β (middle row) and the returns for expressing the correct phenotype γ1 (bottom row). Different lines (gray,
orange, full and dashed) stand for different parameter values, whose values are shown in the inset of each row (rate of individual learning is fixed α = 2 everywhere).
as β → ∞, while under pure vertical transmission (v = 1), it
converges to
E∗ = 2α
2α + (1− γ1) , (41)
which shows that vertical transmission cannot more than double
the amount of information. This is in linewith our result that when
vertical transmission has no effect on the efficiency of transmission
and the dynamic dependence of E is linear in v (Eq. (31)), trans-
mission has a moderate effect on cumulative cultural evolution
(Section 2.5).
Our finding that vertical transmission has little effect on cu-
mulative cultural evolution is also consistent with the results
of Kobayashi et al. (2015), who considered a haploid popula-
tion when adaptive information is the total stock of knowledge
held by an individual at the stage of reproduction and marginal
learning costs are constant (with λ = γ1 = 0, see Appendix D
Eqs. (D.4)–(D.11) for an application of our framework to Kobayashi
et al., 2015’s model). A comparison with Kobayashi et al. (2015)’s
results allows us to evaluate the role of diploidy on cumulative
culture when marginal learning costs are constant (γ1 = 0).
If Kobayashi et al. (2015)’s model showed a limited effect of
intermediate vertical transmission (0 < v < 1), it showed that
pure vertical transmission (v = 1) could have a strong positive
influence on learning. This strong effect arises because when v =
1, the amplification factor Λ(θ ) of learning benefits can go to
infinity (see Eq. (D.11) in Appendix D). By contrast, the effect of
pure vertical transmission (v = 1) remains moderate in diploids
because relatedness between a focal individual and its exemplar
is half of that under haploid reproduction and so the amplification
factorΛ(θ ) is at most 2 (Eqs. (29) and (31)).
The other parameters of the model also affect the singular
learning strategies (θ∗L , θ
∗
IL) and therefore the level of adaptive
information E∗ at equilibrium. The rate of SL β has a negative effect
on the level of IL θ∗IL (Eq. (36)), and hence positive effect on SL, but
only a moderate effect on adaptive information E∗ (Fig. 2, middle
row). By contrast, the returns of investment into reproduction γ1
when expressing the correct phenotype significantly increase both
the investment into learning θ∗L and adaptive information E∗ (Fig. 2,
bottom row). This is because γ1 decreases the marginal cost of
learning,
− ∂ f (τL, E(θ, θ ))
∂τL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ
= (1− γ1)E(θ, θ )(1− θL)−γ1 , (42)
and hence the effective cost of learning,
Ce(θ ) = (1− γ1)E(θ, θ )1− θL . (43)
Previous studies have in their majority assumed that marginal
learning costs are constant (γ1 = 0 so that the marginal cost
is E(θ, θ )), which results in high effective learning cost (Ce(θ ) =
E(θ, θ )/(1 − θL), Lehmann et al., 2013; Wakano and Miura, 2014;
Kobayashi et al., 2015; Ohtsuki et al., 2017). Our results therefore
highlight the importance of the marginal and effective cost of
learning, or more generally of the learning-reproduction trade-
off. Note that for all parameter values displayed in Fig. 2, we
checked numerically (by applying Eqs. (18)–(19), see Appendix B)
that singular learning strategy (θ∗L , θ
∗
IL) defined by Eqs. (36)–(39)
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Fig. 3. Phase portrait of the co-evolutionary dynamics of θL and θIL given by
the selection gradients on each corresponding trait (Eqs. (29) and (32) using
Eqs. (34)–(35) and λ = 0, other parameters: α = 1, β = 8, and γ1 = 0.5 and
v = 0.75). The evolutionary dynamics converge to the single interior point shown in
blue (θ∗L = 0.436, θ∗IL = 0.306), which is convergence stable as can be seen from the
graph, and which can also be shown to be locally uninvadable (using Appendix B).
is convergence stable (Fig. 3) and locally uninvadable, which was
confirmed by individual based simulations (Fig. 4).
2.5.2. Effect of vertical transmission on evolutionary branching
We now turn to the case in which individuals with the wrong
phenotype can obtain returns on investment in fecundity, λ > 0,
and consider that an individual with the correct phenotype does
not need to invest much into reproduction to obtain a fecundity
gain (concave returns, 0 < γ1 < 1), while an individual with
the wrong phenotype needs to invest significantly more into re-
production to have a fecundity gain (convex returns, γ2 > 1, see
Fig. 1).
We find that the singular strategy for individual learning θIL is
the same as when λ = 0 (Eq. (36)), but we are unable to obtain
a general analytical solution for singular strategies for investment
into learning (θL). The model is therefore studied numerically and
the main qualitative outcomes are as follows (see Appendix F for
details on the numerical approach). By contrast to our results with
λ = 0, it is more difficult for learning (θL) to evolve from zero and
the evolutionary dynamics to converge to an interior equilibrium
(θ∗L ∈ (0, 1), θ∗IL ∈ (0, 1)). This is because when individuals with
the wrong phenotype obtain a significant fecundity benefit when
all resources are invested into reproduction (θL = 0), amutant that
invests only a little into learning cannot compete with a resident
who invests all into reproduction. Only over a critical threshold
of learning does extra investment into learning become beneficial
compared to the cost of diverting resources from reproduction, in
which case both learning and SL can be favored (see Fig. 5).
When amixed convergence stable interior strategy exists (θ∗L ∈
(0, 1), θ∗IL ∈ (0, 1)), our analysis suggests that it is usually un-
invadable (Appendix F). We found nevertheless parameter val-
ues for which convergence stable interior equilibria are locally
invadable (i.e., disruptive selection occurs), so that evolutionary
branching (Geritz et al., 1997, 1998) can happen at these. Simu-
lations showed that when it occurs, evolutionary branching leads
to the emergence of two morphs, one that does less IL than
the equilibrium, and who selfishly exploits the other that does
more IL than the convergence stable equilibrium (Fig. 6). We find
that vertical transmission is important for disruptive selection, in
general inhibiting it (Appendix F and Supplementary Figure 1).
This is because vertical transmission prevents adaptive cultural
information from being transmitted from lineages that perform
individual learning to others that do not. Our finding that ver-
tical transmission, which increases the correlation among genes
Fig. 4. Comparison between analytical results and individual-based simulations.
In each panel, analytical equilibria are shown in full lines (θ∗L in blue, θ
∗
IL in red,
and E∗ in purple given by Eqs. (36)–(39), with α = 1, β = 8, and γ1 = 0.5).
The results of simulations (described in Appendix E) are given by the temporal
population trait averages (points, same color as lines) and the temporal standard
deviation of population trait averages (error bars centered on averages, same color
as lines). The top panel is for a population size of N = 100, middle for N = 1000,
and bottom for N = 10, 000, which show a good agreement between analytical
predictions and simulation results, especially for large populations inwhich genetic
drift has little effect and in which deviations between invasion analysis results and
exact results for finite population based on fixation probabilities are of the order
1/N (Rousset, 2004).
Fig. 5. Phase portrait given by the selection gradients on each trait (Eqs. (29) and
(32) with v = 0, α = 2, β = 3, γ1 = 0.9, γ2 = 3, λ = 0.7) and evolutionary
convergence equilibria shown in blue (blue line for zero, and filled blue circle for
convergence stable interior point), which shows that either θL converges to zero, or
both θL and θIL converge to an interior equilibrium (θ∗L , θ
∗
IL) depending on the initial
population values. As the graph shows, the co-evolutionary dynamics of θL and θIL
exhibit bistability and the population must cross a threshold level of learning in
order for selection to favor greater investment into learning.
and culture, inhibits disruptive is in line with the finding that
a reduction in migration (which increases relatedness) inhibits
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Fig. 6. Evolutionary branching and stability. Bivariate distributions of trait values
(θL and θIL), depicted as two-dimensional color histograms with bins of width 0.02
and in which bin color gives the frequency of individuals within each bin (see
figure legend), obtained under individual-based simulations (frequencies averaged
over the last 103 generations after 9.9× 104 generations of evolution, parameters:
α = 2, β = 12, γ1 = 0.7, γ2 = 5, λ = 0.7, Appendix E for details). When
v = 0.4, the population is split into two morphs around the interior convergence
stable equilibrium (θ∗L , θ
∗
IL) (blue empty circle), but when v = 1 the population is
unimodal, centered around the convergence stable equilibrium (blue empty circle).
disruptive selection in spatially structured populations (e.g., Ajar,
2003; Mullon et al., 2016).
3. Discussion
In spite of the evidence that cultural transmission often occurs
between parent and offspring (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981;
Guglielmino et al., 1995; Hewlett et al., 2011; Konner, 2010), the
bulk of theoretical work on gene–culture co-evolution for cumu-
lative culture has focused on oblique or horizontal transmission
(e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Rogers, 1988; Enquist et al., 2007;
Rendell et al., 2010; Nakahashi, 2010; Aoki et al., 2012; Lehmann
et al., 2013; Nakahashi, 2013; Aoki and Feldman, 2014; Wakano
and Miura, 2014). In this paper, we derived the invasion fitness of
a mutant allele that co-evolves with cumulative cultural informa-
tion under vertical transmission. We showed that when cultural
dynamics are deterministic and have a single attractor equilibrium,
invasion fitness is equal to the individual fitness of a mutant when
the dynamic of cultural information is at equilibrium (Eq. (5)). This
result allows for an analytically tractable study of gene–culture co-
evolutionary adaptive dynamics in family-structured populations.
Our invasion fitness measure (Eq. (5)) can also be applied to cases
where population size varies, following a deterministic dynamic
with a single attractor point (in which case fitness Eq. (7) is evalu-
ated at this attractor for the resident population, e.g., Ferrière and
Gatto, 1995; Caswell, 2000; Metz, 2011).
Our analysis of the selection gradient revealed that cultural evo-
lution results in carry-over effects across generations, which feed-
back on the selection pressure of traits affecting cultural dynamics
(see Eq. (15)). This feedback arises from kin selection, since an
individual modifying cultural information as a result of expressing
amutant allele will change the environment to which descendants
living in the next or more distant generations are exposed. These
indirect fitness effects depend on the magnitude of how altering
trait values affect cultural information dynamics and how the
resulting change in dynamics affects individuals in downstream
generations (Eq. (15)). From the perspective of a recipient of these
effects, its fitness will depend on a multitude of individuals in past
generations (all those from the ancestral lineage of an individual
carrying a mutation). These multi-generational effects accumulate
in a geometric progression over the lineage of a mutant and can
therefore potentially be large (see Eq. (17)). More broadly, our
approach allows for a clear separation between direct and indirect
effects on fitness and can be readily extended to cover more real-
istic demographic scenarios such as aged-structured populations
with senescence.
We applied our framework to a generic model in which geneti-
cally determined phenotypes that underlie individual learning (IL)
and social learning (SL) co-evolve with the adaptive information
they generate (Eq. (24)), and which generalizes many previous
scenarios for the co-evolution of IL and SL (Rogers, 1988; Enquist et
al., 2007; Aoki and Feldman, 2014;Wakano andMiura, 2014;Naka-
hashi, 2010; Aoki et al., 2012; Lehmann et al., 2013; Wakano and
Miura, 2014; Kobayashi et al., 2015). The analysis of the selection
gradient showed that the impact of vertical transmission, which
increases interactions between relatives and thus kin selection
effects, can be viewed as an amplification factor of the benefits
of learning (Eqs. (29) and (31)). Vertical transmission therefore
favors greater levels of learning and hence cumulative culture. But
when transmission is as efficient between relatives than between
unrelated individuals, learning benefits cannot be amplified by
more than a factor of two in randomly-mating diploids (Eq. (31)).
By contrast, in haploids or when transmission is only among het-
erozygotic mutant parents and offspring, learning benefits can
explode under pure vertical transmission (v = 1, Eq. (D.11)).
The selection pressure on phenotypic carry-over effects impact-
ing relatives is therefore diluted in the presence of diploidy. This
is because diploidy decreases the correlation between genetic and
cultural transmission pathways so that over generations, mutant
alleles also benefit resident ones. The correlation between genes
and vertically transmitted cultural information could be enhanced
for instance by assortative mating between genetically-similar
individuals, which is not taken into account by our formaliza-
tion, and which would presumably offset the dilution effect of
diploidy we observe. Assortative mating, whether it occurs among
genetically or culturally similar individuals, has been shown to
influence gene–culture coevolution when selection is frequency-
independent (Creanza et al., 2012), in which case culture cannot
be cumulative. In the future, it would be relevant to investigate
the impact of assortative mating on cumulative cultural evolution
and its interaction with vertical transmission, as it may magnify
selection on multigenerational effects.
In order to illustrate our results, we analyzed in detail a specific
scenario of the evolution of IL and SL where adaptive information
determines the acquisition of a binary trait describing ‘‘correct’’
and ‘‘wrong’’ phenotype to be expressed in a given environment
(e.g., light a fire, see Eq. (34) and Rogers, 1988;Wakano et al., 2004;
Wakano and Aoki, 2006; Enquist et al., 2007; Rendell et al., 2010;
Kobayashi andWakano, 2012; Wakano and Miura, 2014), and also
provided a mechanistic derivation of the critical social learner
strategy (Enquist et al., 2007; Rendell et al., 2010, see Appendix C).
We found that in the absence of vertical transmission (v = 0) and
with constant marginal learning costs (γ1 = 0 and λ = 0), it is
difficult for culture to accumulate. This corroborates Wakano and
Miura (2014)’s conjecture that in general, learning-reproduction
trade-offs make it more difficult for cumulative culture to evolve.
When transmission occurs vertically, kin selection has a posi-
tive yet moderate quantitative impact on the amount of cultural
information accumulated by individuals in uninvadable popula-
tions for arbitrary marginal learning costs (Fig. 2, Top row). This
generalizes the results of Kobayashi et al. (2015), who studied a
haploidmodelwith constantmarginal learning costs. Theweak kin
selection effects on cumulative culture we observe also echo Oht-
suki et al. (2017)’s results on the evolution of IL and SL, when
cultural transmission occurs within spatial groups connected by
limited dispersal. In this case, oblique transmission occurs be-
tween genetically related individuals, which increases positive
kin selection effects on cumulative culture. But limited dispersal
also increases kin competition, which disfavors the transmission
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of adaptive cultural information. Overall, Ohtsuki et al. (2017)
found that kin selection has an appreciable effect on cumulative
culture only under extreme kin structure (small local groups, low
dispersal, which is akin to markedly increase Λ(θ ) in Eq. (29)).
Our results are therefore in line with the notion that kin selec-
tion has weak effects on the accumulation of adaptive informa-
tion across generations, at least when information is transmit-
ted as efficiently between family members as between unrelated
individuals.
By contrast, we showed that the parameter γ1, which influences
the costs of learning (Eqs. (42)–(43)), can have a significant quan-
titative influence on the uninvadable level of adaptive information
and affect cumulative culture by an order of magnitude (Fig. 2,
bottom row). Our results therefore stress the importance of the
shape of the learning-reproduction trade-off, which has perhaps
been under-appreciated by a literature that has mostly considered
constant marginal learning costs (e.g., Rogers, 1988; Wakano et
al., 2004; Wakano and Aoki, 2006; Enquist et al., 2007; Rendell
et al., 2010; Kobayashi and Wakano, 2012; Lehmann et al., 2013;
Kobayashi et al., 2015; Ohtsuki et al., 2017, but see Nakahashi,
2010 for an exception). Like in our model, non-linear marginal
learning costs will arise when expressing a correct cultural phe-
notype entails rapidly rising returns of resources allocated into
reproduction (γ1 > 0, Fig. 1), which is a plausible biological
scenario. For instance, being able to light a fire, which allows
warming and feeding a high energy diet to one’s offspring, is likely
to produce sharply rising fecundity returns. However, in the ab-
sence of any empirical quantification of learning costs and benefits,
it is difficult to make any conclusion about their role relative to
vertical transmission on cultural evolution in natural populations.
The quantification of these costs and benefits across the lifespan
of individuals unfortunately remains a neglected topic in cultural
evolution (Demps et al., 2012).
To conclude, we have shown that when the effect of learning
on the adaptive information held by an individual is indepen-
dent from whether learning occurs between family members or
between unrelated individuals, vertical transmission moderately
increases levels of adaptive cultural information through kin se-
lection effects. But our model suggests that if vertical transmis-
sion interacts with cultural dynamics, then vertical transmission
may have a large influence on cumulative culture (Eqs. (15) and
(33)). This would occur for example if offspring learn better from
relatives, or if parents devote more teaching effort towards off-
spring than towards unrelated individuals. Such scenarios would
be relevant to investigate in future research, and also raise the
question of the evolution of vertical transmission itself. In addition,
our finding that vertical transmission inhibits disruptive selection
suggests that it can play a qualitative role in the evolution of
IL and SL learning strategies themselves (e.g., conformist trans-
mission, payoff biased transmission, teaching), whose evolution
under vertical transmission have not been much investigated. Our
approach can be readily accommodated to study all these specific
questions, and more broadly, questions on niche construction and
gene–culture co-evolution within the family where the modified
rates of cultural transmission have long-lasting effects on future
generations.
Acknowledgments
We thank Yutaka Kobayashi for useful discussions about cul-
tural evolution and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments to improve our manuscript. CM is funded by Swiss NSF
grant 31003A-166657 to LL.
Appendix A. Invasion fitness
Given the definition of individual fitnessw(τ , θ, Et (τ , θ )) in the
main text and the associated dynamics for the cultural information
Et (τ , θ ) (Eq. (2)), our modeling assumptions entail that invasion
fitness is given by the geometric growth rate
log(W (τ , θ )) = lim
h→∞
1
h
log
(
h−1∏
t=0
w(τ , θ, Et (τ , θ ))
)
(A.1)
(Cohen, 1979; Tuljapurkar, 1989; Charlesworth, 1994; Ferrière and
Gatto, 1995; Caswell, 2000; van Baalen, 2013). It is in general chal-
lenging to evaluate Eq. (A.1) explicitly under an arbitrary dynamics
of Et (τ , θ ) (Tuljapurkar, 1989). But since we assume that the
sequence of environments {Et (τ , θ )}∞t=0 converges to a unique fixed
point E(τ , θ ) (satisfying Eq. (4)), the limit of Eq. (A.1) converges to
lim
h→∞
1
h
log
(
h−1∏
t=0
w(τ , θ, Et (τ , θ ))
)
= log (w(τ , θ, E(τ , θ ))) (A.2)
(see also Ferrière and Gatto, 1995), and so invasion fitness is
given by
W (τ , θ ) = w(τ, θ, E(τ , θ )) . (A.3)
Appendix B. Second-order conditions
From Eq. (18) we can evaluate the condition of strong conver-
gence stability for a singular point θ∗ = (θ∗IL, θ∗L ) satisfying Eq. (10).
This requires that the Jacobian matrix
J(θ∗) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
sIL(θ )
∂θIL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
θ=θ∗
∂sIL(θ )
∂θL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
θ=θ∗
∂sL(θ )
∂θIL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
θ=θ∗
∂sL(θ )
∂θL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
θ=θ∗
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ (B.1)
is negative-definite, which entails that all its eigenvalues have
negative real parts (e.g., Lessard, 1990; Leimar, 2009; Mullon et
al., 2016).Meanwhile, a singular point θ∗ = (θ∗IL, θ∗L ) is uninvadable
when the Hessian matrix
H(θ∗) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂2w(τ , θ∗, E(τ , θ∗))
∂τ 2IL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ∗
∂2w(τ , θ∗, E(τ , θ∗))
∂τIL∂τL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ∗
∂2w(τ , θ∗, E(τ , θ∗))
∂τIL∂τL
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ∗
∂2w(τ , θ∗, E(τ , θ∗))
∂τ 2L
⏐⏐⏐⏐
τ=θ∗
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
(B.2)
is negative-definite, or equivalently that both its eigenvalues are neg-
ative (note that since H(θ∗) has real entries and is symmetric, its
eigenvalues are necessarily real, e.g., Lessard, 1990; Leimar, 2009;
Mullon et al., 2016).
Appendix C. Cultural dynamics
We derive here Eq. (34) by assuming a fast time scale of learning
within a single demographic time period and by setting the total time
length of learning to unity. This approach is equivalent to previous
models of cultural information (Aoki et al., 2012; Lehmann et al., 2013;
Wakano and Miura, 2014; Kobayashi et al., 2015; Ohtsuki et al., 2017).
We start by assuming that the resident population is at its equi-
librium for cultural dynamics (satisfying Eq. (3)). Then, an individual
first learns from the parental generation (either vertically or obliquely)
at rate β per unit time and we assume that the rate of change of the
adaptive information E(h) held at time h of the fast time scale of an
individual is
dE(h)
dh
= β [ET − E(h)] , (C.1)
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which for a mutant holds for h ∈ [0, (1 − τIL)τL] (i.e., (1 − τIL)τL is the
time spent performing SL) and where ET is the cultural information of
the exemplar individual (or cultural parent) and the initial condition is
E(0) = 0. Eq. (C.1) entails that an individual acquires the correct pheno-
type proportionally to β and the difference between the probabilities
that the focal and that the exemplar have the correct phenotype. The
solution of Eq. (C.1) is
E(h) = [1− exp(−βh)] ET for h ∈ [0, (1− τIL)τL]. (C.2)
After SL has been performed, the individual performs IL and the rate of
change in adaptive information E(h) during IL is given by
dE(h)
dh
= α [1− E(h)] , (C.3)
which for a mutant holds for h ∈ ((1 − τIL)τL, τL] (i.e., τILτL is the
time spent performing IL) with initial condition E((1 − τIL)τL) (given
by Eq. (C.2)). According to Eq. (C.3), the individual acquires the correct
phenotype by IL proportionally to α and its current distance to the ‘‘tar-
get’’ which is 1. This formulation implements standard reinforcement
learning (Bush and Mosteller, 1951). The solution to Eq. (C.3) is
E(h) = 1− exp(−αh)+ exp(−αh)E((1− τIL)τL)
for h ∈ ((1− τIL)τL, τL]. (C.4)
Combining Eq. (C.2) and Eq. (C.4) yields that at the final time of the
learning period (h = τL), say at generation t , the amount of adaptive
information held by a mutant is
Et (τ , θ ) = 1− exp(−ατILτL)  
aIL(τ )
+ exp(−ατILτL) [1− exp(−β(1− τIL)τL)]  
pSL(τ )
ET, (C.5)
which yields the components of Eq. (34) of the main text and where
ET is equal to the average cultural information of the cases when the
individual performs vertical transmission ((Et−1(τ , θ )+E(θ, θ ))/2) and
when it performs oblique transmission (E(θ, θ )).
Interestingly, the right hand side of Eq. (C.5) can be equivalently
written as
Et (τ , θ ) = [1− exp(−β(1− τIL)τL)]  
pOK→OK
ET
+
(
1− [1− exp(−β(1− τIL)τL)] ET
)
× [1− exp(−ατILτL)]  
pOK
, (C.6)
where pOK→OK is the probability of obtaining the correct phenotype
via social learning from an individual with the correct phenotype, and
pOK is the probability of obtaining the correct phenotype via individual
learning. Eq. (C.6) shows that we can interpret this model in terms of
an individual first attempting to learn the ‘‘correct’’ solution by SL, and
if it is unsuccessful, it tries to acquire the correct phenotype by IL. This
is equivalent to the learning strategy called critical SL (Enquist et al.,
2007; Rendell et al., 2010).
Appendix D. Connection to previous work
Critical social learning without reproductive trade-offs
We can apply our framework to study the evolution of critical social
learning as considered previously (Enquist et al., 2007; Rendell et al.,
2010). Assuming that learning has no marginal cost (i.e., γ1 = 1), that
there is no vertical transmission (v = 0), and that all individuals engage
into learning (θL = 1), we obtain that the singular IL strategy, which is
given by Eq. (36), reduces to
θ∗IL =
1
α
log
(
β
β − α
)
. (D.1)
This in turn implies the level of adaptive information, which is given by
Eq. (39), is
E∗ = αe
β
αeβ + β
(
β
β−α
) β
α −1
, (D.2)
which tends to one as β →∞. Using Eq. (C.6), it is possible to express
equilibrium Eq. (D.2) in terms of pOK→OK = 1 − exp(−β(1 − θ∗IL)), the
probability of obtaining the correct phenotype via SL from an individual
with the correct phenotype, and pOK = 1− exp(−αθ∗IL), the probability
of obtaining the correct phenotype via individual learning,
E∗ = p
OK
1− (1− pOK)pOK→OK . (D.3)
This shows immediately that E∗ goes from pOK to 1 as pOK→OK goes from
zero to one, as found by Enquist et al. (2007).
Cumulative culture with reproductive trade-offs
We can also use our framework to recover the results about vertical
transmission obtained by Kobayashi et al. (2015). As implied by eqs.
(1)–(2) of Kobayashi et al., 2015, the contributions to culture from IL
and SL are now given by
aIL(τ ) = ατILτL and pSL(τ ) = 1− exp(−β(1− τIL)τL). (D.4)
Then, to obtain a haploid version of cultural dynamics from our model,
we simply drop the factor of diploid reproduction in Eq. (24) and write
the dynamics of cultural information as
Et+1(τ , θ ) = aIL(τ )+ pSL(τ , β) [vEt (τ , θ )+ (1− v)E(θ, θ )] , (D.5)
which at the equilibrium is
E(τ , θ ) = aIL(τ )
1− vpSL(τ ) +
(1− v)pSL(τ )
1− vpSL(τ ) ×
aIL(θ )
(1− pSL(θ )) . (D.6)
According to eq. (4) of Kobayashi et al., 2015, fecundity is given by
f (τL, E(τ , θ )) = 1+ E(τ , θ )(1− τL), (D.7)
which substituted into fitness (Eq. (20)) with Eqs. (D.4) and (D.6), gives
that the singular strategies are
sIL(θ ) = 0 H⇒ θ∗IL =
1
θ∗L β
, (D.8)
and
sL(θ ) = 0 H⇒ β(1− θ∗L )− v = (1− v) exp
(
βθ∗L − 1
)
. (D.9)
On substituting Eq. (D.8) into the monomorphic equilibrium E(θ, θ )
obtained from Eq. (D.6) we further have
E∗ = 1
β
exp
(
βθ∗L − 1
)
. (D.10)
The latter three equations are equivalent to eqs. (7a)–(7c) of Kobayashi
et al. (2015), respectively.
The strong effect of pure vertical transmission observed in Kobayashi
et al. (2015)’s study can be seen by considering the amplification factor
(Λ(θ ), Eq. (31)) for learning benefits on the learning selection gradient
(see Eq. (29)) for their model (using Eq. (D.5) into Eq. (17)),
Λ(θ ) = 1
1− vpSL(θ ) , (D.11)
which tends to infinity as v and pSL(θ ) go to one. By contrast, in our
model, this amplification cannot exceed 2. Note that benefits could also
be infinitely amplified in diploids if vertical transmission only occurred
between mutants in mutant families so that Eq. (D.5) holds.
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Appendix E. Individual-based simulations
We used Mathematica (Wolfram Research, 2016) to carry out
individual-based simulations of the joint evolution of IL and SL in a
population with N individuals for our explicit model, see Section 2.5
(M-file available on request). Each individual in the population is
characterized by an amount of adaptive information and two linked
diploid loci that respectively determine additively the level of SL and
Il performed by the individual. At the beginning of a generation (taken
as stage (1) of the life cycle, see Section 1.1), we calculate the fecundity
f of each individual according to trait values and cultural variable
(Eq. (35)). Since we assumed semelparous reproduction (Eq. (20)) with
constant population size, we then apply a Wright–Fisher reproductive
process for diploids (Ewens, 2004). Namely, we form N mating pairs
by sampling with replacement 2N individuals from the parental gener-
ation proportionally to their fecundity (hence the number of offspring
produced by individualwith fecundity f follows a binomial distribution
with parameters N and f /(f¯ N) where f¯ is the mean fecundity in the
population). Each mating pair produces an offspring that inherits a
haplotype from each parent (randomly sampled in each parent, i.e., we
assume random segregation). Each locus mutates and a mutation has
an additive effect sampled from a Normal distribution with mean 0
and standard deviation σ . Quantitative loci values are truncated to
remain between 0 and 1. Then we calculate the adaptive information
of each offspring according to Eq. (24). At the start of a simulation, the
population is initially monomorphic for SL, IL and adaptive information
value.
In order to produce Fig. 4, we started with a population set for a
value of 0.5 at each loci and adaptive information.We set highmutation
effects with σ = 0.01 in order to speed up convergence. After a burn-
in period of 5000 generations, we recorded the population average
phenotypic values at each generation for a further 5000 generations.
The temporal means and standard deviations are displayed in Fig. 4.
To test for evolutionary branching (Fig. 6 and Supplementary Figure
1), we startedwith a population at the evolutionary convergence stable
singular values for θL and θIL and corresponding equilibrium adaptive
information (Eq. (26)). We set low mutation effects σ = 0.001 and
large population size N = 10, 000 as low population size prevents
evolutionary branching (e.g., Wakano and Iwasa, 2013; Dèbarre and
Otto, 2016). The population evolved for 1.5× 105 generations.
Appendix F. Numerical analysis when λ > 0
We here detail the numerical analyzes we performed for the case
where λ > 0 (Section 2.5.2). First, we numerically studied which
points are convergence stable by holding α = 2 and varying the other
parameters by considering all combination of v = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75., 1,
β = 2, 3, 5, 9, 12, γ1 = 0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.7, 0.9, γ2 = 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5, and
λ = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 1 (a total of 3125 parameter combinations). To
do this, we iterated
θL(t + 1) = θL(t)+ δsL((θL(t), θIL(t)))
θIL(t + 1)= θIL(t)+ δsIL((θL(t), θIL(t))), (F.1)
using Eqs. (29) and (32) with Eqs. (34)–(35) and δ = 0.02 until the
euclidean distance between two iterates was less than 10−5, i.e.,√
(θL(t + 1)− θL(t))2 + (θIL(t + 1)− θIL(t))2 < 10−5, (F.2)
or for a maximum of 105 steps. We started with 9 different start-
ing values (θL(0), θIL(0)), with θL(0) = 0.05, 0.5, 0.95 and θIL(0) =
0.05, 0.5, 0.95. For each final values, we computed the eigenvalues of
the Hessian matrix to assess local uninvadability (Appendix B).
We find four outcomes for the convergence stability of θL and θIL.
(1) θL always converges to zero, in which case selection on θIL vanishes
(1134/3125 cases). (2) There is a bistability and θL converges to either
zero or to an interior value 0 < θ∗L < 1, while individual learning
θIL goes to one (i.e., no social learning, 689/3125 cases). (3) There is a
bistability and θL converges to either zero or both θL and θIL converge to
an interior equilibrium (θ∗L , θ
∗
IL) where θIL satisfies Eq. (36) (1296/3125
cases, see Fig. 5). (4) In very few cases (6/3125 cases), there are three
convergence stable equilibria: either θL converges to zero; or θL con-
verges to an interior value 0 < θ∗L < 1while individual learning θIL goes
to one; or both θL and θIL converge to an interior equilibrium (θ∗L , θ
∗
IL)
(where θIL satisfies Eq. (36)).
When we assess the local uninvadability (using the eigenvalues of
the Hessian matrix, Appendix B) of interior convergence stable equi-
libria (θ∗L , θ
∗
IL) ∈ (0, 1)2, we find that they are also locally uninvadable
in the majority of cases (1290 out of 1302). In 12 cases (out of 1302),
the interior convergence stable equilibria (θ∗L , θ
∗
IL) ∈ (0, 1)2 was locally
invadable, suggesting that learning undergoes disruptive selection at
these equilibria. By looking at the parameter values under which dis-
ruptive selection occurs, we find that greater rates of vertical transmis-
sion (v) disfavor disruptive selection. For instance, when α = 2, β =
12, γ1 = 0.7, γ2 = 5, λ = 0.7, the convergence stable point (θ∗L , θ∗IL) is
only uninvadable when v > 0.4 (Supplementary Figure 1). Individual
based simulations confirmed our analysis of disruptive selection, and
showed that disruptive selection leads to evolutionary branching and
the emergence of a polymorphism that can be maintained in the long
run in some cases (Supplementary Figure 1).
Appendix G. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2017.06.003.
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